

EXHIBIT K

BOB HUGHES

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EDUCATION

Arizona State University Master of Business Administration	1978
Arizona State University Bachelor of Science Business Administration	1976

TEACHING

Arizona State University
Classes taught: Plant Engineering, Production Management, Cost Estimating, **1978-1989**

Loyola Marymount University
Direct Marketing Certification – Program Manager - 1998-2007

EMPLOYMENT

Organization Hughes Marketing – Marketing Resources President	2005-
Pacific Printing Industries Executive Vice President	2000-2005
World Color Press Major Account Marketing	1995-2000
Continental Graphics President – Franklin Press	1994-1995
California Offset Printers Executive Vice President	1989-1994
Messenger Graphics Corporation Executive Vice President – General Manager 1977-1989 Vice President Sales Manager 1976-1977 Account Executive 1973-1976	1972-1989

HONORS AND AWARDS

Nominated - United States Public Printer 1988 - President George Bush and VP Dan Quayle
Induction – Soderstrom Society - National Association of Print Leadership
SAPPI Award – 1995 Printer of the Year
Phi Theta Kappa Honor Society

MEMBERSHIPS / OFFICES

Printing Industries Association of Arizona -President 1980 -1989
Direct Marketing Association of Arizona - Board of Directors, Committee Member, Speaker
Printing Industries of Southern California / Arizona – Board of Directors 1980 to 1995.
Printing Industries of America – National Board of Directors 1987-1994
Printing Industry Presidents Conference – Chairman / Vice Chairman 1988,1989,1990
National Association of Print Leadership – Board of Directors 1989-1994
Direct Marketing Association of Los Angeles – President 1998 - 2000

The following is a declaration made by Bob Hughes, under penalty of perjury, about the printing of the ballots on-demand and their tabulation at the voting centers of Maricopa County used in the 2022 election.

I have 50 years of experience in the printing industry and more specifically 16 years of experience printing ballots for Maricopa County Elections. In 2021 I also helped establish the auditing criteria for the printing and paper portion of the 2020 Maricopa County ballot audit. I also helped select and setup the equipment used during the audit to do the ballot counting.

On March 6, 2023 I led a team in reviewing and copying the Logic and Accuracy reports for the 2022 Maricopa County Election. I physically inspected the ballots at MCTEC that were used in the testing of the election tabulators. I also reviewed the certification reports for each Maricopa County Voting Center used in the 2022 Election. I also was able to review the Tabulator reports that are printed by the machines during their testing.

The most important and notable finding is that every machine and every voting center report showed that every test was passed without any failures.

The following report is a summary of what was learned during the March 6, 2023 visit to MCTEC.

INTRODUCTION

Unlike I originally believed, that ballots were constructed on-demand at the Voting Center, I learned the ballot styles are prepared for each election at MCTEC. As soon as candidates are determined, software is used to pull together the elements of each voter's personalized ballot. A different ballot was created for each precinct. They refer to these combinations as "ballot styles". Then the ballot style is attached to each voter in that precinct.

DAY OF VOTING

When a voter arrives at a Voting Center their identity is verified by a poll worker using their Driver's License or other acceptable form of ID. The Counties e-poll book system is then used to verify they have not returned a mail-in ballot. Once their eligibility to vote is determined a ballot style is sent to the Print On-Demand printer at the Voting Center. This requires that the E-poll book is online to MECTEC while the printer is networked with the E-poll book.

Because mail-in ballots can be dropped off at a polling center, it is possible that the e-poll book system would not be aware of the return of a mail-in ballot at the time of log-in at the Voting Center.

Two required pieces of equipment are needed to make Voting Centers possible: Electronic poll books and ON-DEMAND ballot printers. Both need to be networked and online at the same time.

E-Poll Books are tablet computers that must connect to a Wi-Fi for access to an up-to-date copy of the County Records and MCTEC records. This is required to allow the e-poll book to verify that a mail-in ballot was not returned prior to issuing a new Day of Ballot.

Ballot STYLES are built ahead of each election and are stored as PDF's for each ballot style. PDF's are locked style formats that cannot be revised on the fly. It has been argued that a wrong ballot format was used to print ballots of the wrong size on the day of the election. It was suggested a 19 inch format was incorrectly used by mistake. However, during the review of the L&A reports at MCTEC I was told only 20 inch formats were created and no 19 inch format ballots were created for the 2022 election.

This indicates that it was not possible that a BALLOT STYLE other than a 20" PDF could have been used, even by accident for the 2022 Election. Yet, on Election Day a substantial number of wrong sized ballots were printed. This clearly indicates that the interference caused by 19" ballots had to have been by someone from MCTEC or by someone hacking into the MCTEC system. Since no failures occurred during even one test of the system and since all the machines were made tamperproof and held in security until used, no other possible reason is plausible. The assertion that random accidents occurred on Election Day is impossible. A large number of printers, all printing ballots of the wrong 19 inch size on Election Day, is not a random accident.

This also indicates that since many ballots failed the scanning by the tabulators due to size, the issue was with the Voting Center on-demand printers. It is also not plausible that the exact same random accident occurred multiple times with independent printers in different locations.

Conclusion: Because the L&A tests showed no errors, the errors had to be introduced after the testing. Because the printer's command module is not available to the poll workers, the interference had to come through the online E-poll book and then to the printers. Because so many printers were affected in so many locations, it shows that it was not happenstance but an orchestrated attack on the election. Further, since the precincts effected showed a high correlation with highly Republican precincts it shows an intentional purpose for the attacks.

On Election Day, I was called by my wife who was experiencing a rejection issue with her ballot. I went to the voting center to see the problem first hand. I witnessed long lines waiting as ballots from two tabulators were repeatedly rejected after multiple attempts. Voters were irritated and Poll workers were confused. The Poll Workers instructed voters to let them take their ballot for "Drawer 3" designated as "Provisional". If the voter was unwilling, they instructed them to "SPOIL" their ballot and begin the process over, including marking a brand new ballot. I personally saw voters with obvious reservations agreeing to reluctantly "Spoil" their ballot to begin again, others allowed their ballot to go into Drawer 3, and still others became frustrated and walked out.

Several people allowed me to view their unreadable ballots. It was easily seen that unreadable ballots were printing with a larger margin at the top and bottom of the page. However, the complete image of the entire ballot was printed, only photographically reduced.

A few of the possible ways this could have occurred would be:

- a. A command changing the printer to "print to fit" with a ½" top and bottom margins.
- b. A change in paper settings to 19" paper resulting in a reduced image.
- c. A change in the paper tray to smaller paper resulting in a reduced image.

At MCTEC, I was told there was one main ballot style per precinct. However, because some precincts have opposing jurisdictional boundaries, those precincts have what are called "SPLITS. A "SPLIT" allows one race to be different within a precinct. Example: School Districts are a common cause for a "SPLIT" within a precinct has residents attending schools in two different school systems. This results in differing School Board Candidates on the ballot. "Split" ballots are identified by adding a designating color.

LOGIC AND ACCURACY TESTING PRIOR TO ELECTION DAY

Logic and Accuracy Tests are **REQUIRED** to perform at a 100% accuracy rate. L&A tests are intended to verify that voting tabulators accurately read a test deck of ballots and assign all of the corresponding voting marks to the correct candidate, and that they count and report the totals correctly.

I was told that the October 11, 2022 test decks were printed at MCTEC.

Though I was not told this, it is assumed the DAY OF Election test decks were printed at each voting center. Several factors make that clear.

- A. Testing preprinted ballots would invalidate testing because the actual equipment is not tested.
- B. Attached to each tabulator test tape is a completed form. These show voting location and are signed by precinct workers along with questions to be completed on the DAY OF Election. The sheet instructs the precinct workers to immediately notify officials of failed tests.

Conclusion:

An intentional change was made to the printers affecting the DAY OF Election ballots.

1. It was not coincidental that so many printers failed to print readable ballots
2. It occurred too many times to be random or accidental.
3. The actual cause of the problem has not been addressed by MCTEC.
4. It occurred at voting centers that corresponded to a high concentration of Republican voters.
5. Due to past elections widespread reports of irregularities with early voting, most people recognize and accept the likelihood more Republican voters would wait to vote in person than Democrat voters who were more likely to mail-in their ballots.
6. Unreadable ballots provide a perfect opportunity for interference in the election.
 - a. Large numbers of ballots could be adjudicated electronically and potentially corrupted by being assigned to any particular candidate.
 - b. Large numbers of ballots could be removed and replaced with any "readable" pre-printed ballot that had been electronically voted.
 - c. Large numbers of ballots could be taken from Drawer 3 and never tabulated. It is possible and even likely poll workers pulled the separator for Drawer 3 and comingled them with tabulated ballots.
 - d. Because ballots were run through tabulators multiple times, reportedly as many as a half-dozen times, the tabulator counter varies widely from the number of actual ballots voted.

It was reported by MCTEC on their website that only 16,724 ballots cast on the DAY OF Election were not counted by a Voting Center tabulator. That is an extremely small number of ballots considering the massive disruption that was caused. Because ballots are strictly controlled and a limited number of ballots were reported taken to be counted following the election, it is not plausible that the number of ballots left to be counted was off by such a large number, as actually occurred in 2022.

Robert Hughes

Robert Hughes

Robert Hughes

Signature

3-29-2023

Date

Counting objects made of paper by weighing them is one of the most accurate and efficient ways to verify the count of the objects. Paper has two relative measurements that can be used in count verification. Those two are thickness and weight. Paper is manufactured, identified and sold by weight. Paper weight is maintained within extremely high tolerances and is relied upon throughout the printing industries to be a trustworthy way to conduct business.

All paper manufacturing operations buy paper based on the cost per pound. And, all paper is identified by its basis weight. The relative correlation to weight is the paper thickness. Once a batch of pulp is formulated, it establishes the relationship of both the weight and thickness of the paper to be manufactured. Paper is manufactured to fall within very specific parameters. Controlling the amount of pulp used to form a particular sheet of paper by controlling its thickness as it is manufactured insures the paper meets the standard basis weight of the paper being made.

These two objective standards for paper are exceptionally reliable and are used by all parts of the printing industry to maintain control and accuracy. The US Post Office weigh verifies the postage charged for millions of pieces of mail every single day. Once a sample weight of the piece being mailed is established, weight is used to charge the postage for every subsequent batch of mail. It has been time tested and proven to be the most efficient and accurate means of counting printed pieces being mailed.

Ballots are no different and using weight to accurately count batches of ballots is the most efficient way to establish quantities of ballots. Printers use highly accurate scales to weigh pieces being received as a means of establishing the count. Far from a mere estimate of quantity, weigh counting is an extremely accurate way to establish quantity control throughout the further processing of the ballots.

Any variation of count should be considered highly suspect. Because ballots are made of very thick and very stable paper, a miscount of any significance by weight is nearly impossible.

Ballot paper is manufactured by only a select number of highly capable paper mills. Each mill must have modern, well-maintained equipment with the most sophisticated quality control possible. Because of the amount of security and diverse processes ballots go through, many characteristics of ballot paper are scrutinized. Not only weight and thickness, but also smoothness, rigidity, foldability, porosity, opacity, and ink hold out are considered in formulating the paper pulp. Because so much of an elections integrity rely on ballot paper, its understandable why it is part of a very small niche of papers that are referred to in the industry as, "Security Paper".

Generalizations can be used to understand how large miscounting of ballots by weight is impossible. A count of 240,000 ballots weighing about one ounce each would weigh 15,000 lbs. A count of 25,000 ballots would weigh 1,562 lbs. When in boxes that average 25 pounds, 25,000 ballots would represent over 60 boxes of ballots. This would represent a stack of boxes 50 feet tall.

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